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A l'intérieur du SOC

Compromission d'un courriel d'entreprise par une campagne de phishing de masse : Analyse de l'attaque

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20
Apr 2022
20
Apr 2022

It is common for attackers to send large volumes of malicious emails from the email accounts which they compromise. Before carrying out this mass-mailing activity, there are predictable, preparatory steps which attackers take, such as registering mass-mailing applications and creating new inbox rules. In this blog, we will provide details of an attack observed in February 2022 in which a threat actor conducted a successful mass-mailing attack at a financial company based in Africa.

Attack summary

In February 2022, an attacker attempted to infiltrate the email environment of a financial services company based in Africa. At the beginning of February, the attacker likely gained a foothold in the company’s email environment by tricking an internal user into entering the credentials of their corporate email account into a phishing page. Over the following week, the attacker used the compromised account credentials to conduct a variety of activities, such as registering a mass-mailing application and creating a new inbox rule.

After taking these preparatory steps, the attacker went on to send out large volumes of phishing emails from the internal user’s email account. The attacker consequently obtained the credentials of several further internal corporate accounts. They used the credentials of one of these accounts to carry out similar preparatory steps (registering a mass-mailing application and creating a new inbox rule). After taking these steps, the attacker again sent large volumes of phishing emails from the account. At this point, the customer requested assistance from Darktrace’s SOC to aid investigation, and the intrusion was consequently contained by the company.

Since the attacker carried out their activities using a VPN and an Amazon cloud service, the endpoints from which the activities took place did not serve as particularly helpful indicators of an attack. However, prior to sending out phishing emails from internal users’ accounts, the attacker did carry out other predictable, preparatory activities. One of the main goals of this blog is to highlight that these behaviors serve as valuable signs of preparation for mass-mailing activity.

Attack timeline

Figure 1: Timeline of the intrusion

On February 3, the attacker sent a phishing email to the corporate account of an employee. The email was sent from the corporate account of an employee at a company with business ties to the victim enterprise. It is likely that the attacker had compromised this account prior to sending the phishing email from it. The phishing email in question claimed to be an overdue payment reminder. Within the email, there was a link hidden behind the display text “view invoice”. The hostname of the phishing link’s URL was a subdomain of questionpro[.]eu — an online survey platform. The page referred to by the URL was a fake Microsoft Outlook login page.

Figure 2: Destination of phishing link within the email sent by the attacker

Antigena Email, Darktrace’s email security solution, identified the highly unusual linguistic structure of the email, given its understanding of ‘normal’ for that sender. This was reflected in an inducement shift score of 100. However, in this case, the original URL of the phishing link was rewritten by Mimecast’s URL protection service in a way which made the full URL impossible to extract. Consequently, Antigena Email did not know what the original URL of the link was. Since the link was rewritten by Mimecast’s URL protection service, the email’s recipient will have received a warning notification in their browser upon clicking the link. It seems that the recipient ignored the warning, and consequently divulged their email account credentials to the attacker.

For Antigena Email to hold an email from a user’s mailbox, it must judge with high confidence that the email is malicious. In cases where the email contains no suspicious attachments or links, it is difficult for Antigena Email to obtain such high degrees of confidence, unless the email displays clear payload-independent malicious indicators, such as indicators of spoofing or indicators of extortion. In this case, the email, as seen by Antigena Email, didn’t contain any suspicious links or attachments (since Mimecast had rewritten the suspicious link) and the email didn’t contain any indicators of spoofing or extortion.

Figure 3: The email’s high inducement shift score highlights that the email’s linguistic content and structure were unusual for the email’s sender

Shortly after receiving the email, the internal user’s corporate device was observed making SSL connections to the questionpro[.]eu phishing endpoint. It is likely that the user divulged their email account credentials during these connections.

Figure 4: The above screenshot — obtained from Advanced Search — depicts the connections made by the account owner’s device on February 3

Between February 3 and February 7, the attacker logged into the user’s email account several times. Since these logins were carried out using a common VPN service, they were not identified as particularly unusual by Darktrace. However, during their login sessions, the attacker exhibited behavior which was highly unusual for the email account’s owner. The attacker was observed creating an inbox rule called “ _ ” on the user’s email account,[1] as well as registering and granting permissions to a mass-mailing application called Newsletter Software SuperMailer. These steps were taken by the attacker in preparation for their subsequent mass-mailing activity.

On February 7, the attacker sent out phishing emails from the user’s account. The emails were sent to hundreds of internal and external mailboxes. The email claimed to be an overdue payment reminder and it contained a questionpro[.]eu link hidden behind the display text “view invoice”. It is likely that the inbox rule created by the attacker caused all responses to this phishing email to be deleted. Attackers regularly create inbox rules on the email accounts which they compromise to ensure that responses to the malicious emails which they distribute are hidden from the accounts’ owners.[2]

Since Antigena Email does not have visibility of internal-to-internal emails, the phishing email was delivered fully weaponized to hundreds of internal mailboxes. On February 7, after the phishing email was sent from the compromised internal account, more than twenty internal devices were observed making SSL connections to the relevant questionpro[.]eu endpoint, indicating that many internal users had clicked the phishing link and possibly revealed their account credentials to the attacker.

Figure 5: The above screenshot — obtained from Advanced Search — depicts the large volume of connections made by internal devices to the phishing endpoint

Over the next five days, the attacker was observed logging into the corporate email accounts of at least six internal users. These logins were carried out from the same VPN endpoints as the attacker’s original logins. On February 11, the attacker was observed creating an inbox rule named “ , ” on one of these accounts. Shortly after, the attacker went on to register and grant permissions to the same mass-mailing application, Newsletter Software SuperMailer. As with the other account, these steps were taken by the attacker in preparation for subsequent mass-mailing activity.

Figure 6: The above screenshot — obtained from Advanced Search — outlines all of the actions involving the mass-mailing application that were taken by the attacker (accounts have been redacted)

On February 11, shortly after 08:30 (UTC), the attacker widely distributed a phishing email from this second user’s account. The phishing email was distributed to hundreds of internal and external mailboxes. Unlike the other phishing emails used by the attacker, this one claimed to be a purchase order notification, and it contained an HTML file named PurchaseOrder.html. Within this file, there was a link to a suspicious page on the public relations (PR) news site, everything-pr[.]com. After the phishing email was sent from the compromised internal account, more than twenty internal devices were observed making SSL connections to the relevant everything-pr[.]com endpoint, indicating that many internal users had opened the malicious attachment.

Figure 7: The above screenshot — obtained from Advanced Search — depicts the connections made by internal devices to the endpoint referenced in the malicious attachment

On February 11, the customer submitted an Ask the Expert (ATE) request to Darktrace’s SOC team. The guidance provided by the SOC helped the security team to contain the intrusion. The attacker managed to maintain a presence within the organization’s email environment for eight days. During these eight days, the attacker sent out large volumes of phishing emails from two corporate accounts. Before sending out these phishing emails, the attacker carried out predictable, preparatory actions. These actions included registering a mass-mailing application with Azure AD and creating an inbox rule.

Darktrace guidance

There are many learning points for this particular intrusion. First, it is important to be mindful of signs of preparation for malicious mass-mailing activity. After an attacker compromises an email account, there are several actions which they will likely perform before they send out large volumes of malicious emails. For example, they may create an inbox rule on the account, and they may register a mass-mailing application with Azure AD. The Darktrace models SaaS / Compliance / New Email Rule and SaaS / Admin / OAuth Permission Grant are designed to pick up on these behaviors.

Second, in cases where an attacker succeeds in sending out phishing emails from an internal, corporate account, it is advised that customers make use of Darktrace’s Advanced Search to identify users that may have divulged account credentials to the attacker. The phishing email sent from the compromised account will likely contain a suspicious link. Once the hostname of the link has been identified, it is possible to ask Advanced Search to display all HTTP or SSL connections to the host in question. If the hostname is www.example.com, you can get Advanced Search to display all SSL connections to the host by using the Advanced Search query, @fields.server_name:"www.example.com", and you can get Advanced Search to display all HTTP connections to the host by using the query, @fields.host:"www.example.com".

Third, it is advised that customers make use of Darktrace’s ‘watched domains’ feature[3] in cases where an attacker succeeds in sending out malicious emails from the accounts they compromise. If a hostname is added to the watched domains list, then a model named Compromise / Watched Domain will breach whenever an internal device is observed connecting to it. If Antigena Network is configured, then observed attempts to connect to the relevant host will be blocked if the hostname is added to the watched domains list with the ‘flag for Antigena’ toggle switched on. If an attacker succeeds in sending out a malicious email from an internal, corporate account, it is advised that customers add hostnames of phishing links within the email to the watched domains list and enable the Antigena flag. Doing so will cause Darktrace to identify and thwart any attempts to connect to the relevant phishing endpoints.

Figure 8: The above screenshot — obtained from the Model Editor — shows that Antigena Network prevented ten internal devices from connecting to phishing endpoints after the relevant phishing hostnames were added to the watched domains list on February 11

For Darktrace customers who want to find out more about phishing detection, refer here for an exclusive supplement to this blog.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed

Thanks to Paul Jennings for his contributions.

Footnotes

1. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps

2. https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/threat-intelligence-reports/rpt-fin4.html

3. https://customerportal.darktrace.com/product-guides/main/watched-domains

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Protecting Prospects: How Darktrace Detected an Account Hijack Within Days of Deployment

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28
Sep 2023

Cloud Migration Expanding the Attack Surface

Cloud migration is here to stay – accelerated by pandemic lockdowns, there has been an ongoing increase in the use of public cloud services, and Gartner has forecasted worldwide public cloud spending to grow around 20%, or by almost USD 600 billion [1], in 2023. With more and more organizations utilizing cloud services and moving their operations to the cloud, there has also been a corresponding shift in malicious activity targeting cloud-based software and services, including Microsoft 365, a prominent and oft-used Software-as-a-Service (SaaS).

With the adoption and implementation of more SaaS products, the overall attack surface of an organization increases – this gives malicious actors additional opportunities to exploit and compromise a network, necessitating proper controls to be in place. This increased attack surface can leave organization’s open to cyber risks like cloud misconfigurations, supply chain attacks and zero-day vulnerabilities [2]. In order to achieve full visibility over cloud activity and prevent SaaS compromise, it is paramount for security teams to deploy sophisticated security measures that are able to learn an organization’s SaaS environment and detect suspicious activity at the earliest stage.

Darktrace Immediately Detects Hijacked Account

In May 2023, Darktrace observed a chain of suspicious SaaS activity on the network of a customer who was about to begin their trial of Darktrace/Cloud™ and Darktrace/Email™. Despite being deployed on the network for less than a week, Darktrace DETECT™ recognized that the legitimate SaaS account, belonging to an executive at the organization, had been hijacked. Darktrace/Email was able to provide full visibility over inbound and outbound mail and identified that the compromised account was subsequently used to launch an internal spear-phishing campaign.

If Darktrace RESPOND™ were enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of this compromise, it would have been able to take swift preventative action to disrupt the account compromise and prevent the ensuing phishing attack.

Account Hijack Attack Overview

Unusual External Sources for SaaS Credentials

On May 9, 2023, Darktrace DETECT/Cloud detected the first in a series of anomalous activities performed by a Microsoft 365 user account that was indicative of compromise, namely a failed login from an external IP address located in Virginia.

Figure 1: The failed login notice, as seen in Darktrace DETECT/Cloud. The notice includes additional context about the failed login attempt to the SaaS account.

Just a few minutes later, Darktrace observed the same user credential being used to successfully login from the same unusual IP address, with multi-factor authentication (MFA) requirements satisfied.

Figure 2: The “Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use” model breach summary, showing the successful login to the SaaS user account (with MFA), from the rare external IP address.

A few hours after this, the user credential was once again used to login from a different city in the state of Virginia, with MFA requirements successfully met again. Around the time of this activity, the SaaS user account was also observed previewing various business-related files hosted on Microsoft SharePoint, behavior that, taken in isolation, did not appear to be out of the ordinary and could have represented legitimate activity.

The following day, May 10, however, there were additional login attempts observed from two different states within the US, namely Texas and Florida. Darktrace understood that this activity was extremely suspicious, as it was highly improbable that the legitimate user would be able to travel over 2,500 miles in such a short period of time. Both login attempts were successful and passed MFA requirements, suggesting that the malicious actor was employing techniques to bypass MFA. Such MFA bypass techniques could include inserting malicious infrastructure between the user and the application and intercepting user credentials and tokens, or by compromising browser cookies to bypass authentication controls [3]. There have also been high-profile cases in the recent years of legitimate users mistakenly (and perhaps even instinctively) accepting MFA prompts on their token or mobile device, believing it to be a legitimate process despite not having performed the login themselves.

New Email Rule

On the evening of May 10, following the successful logins from multiple US states, Darktrace observed the Microsoft 365 user creating a new inbox rule, named “.’, in Microsoft Outlook from an IP located in Florida. Threat actors are often observed naming new email rules with single characters, likely to evade detection, but also for the sake of expediency so as to not expend any additional time creating meaningful labels.

In this case the newly created email rules included several suspicious properties, including ‘AlwaysDeleteOutlookRulesBlob’, ‘StopProcessingRules’ and “MoveToFolder”.

Firstly, ‘AlwaysDeleteOutlookRulesBlob’ suppresses or hides warning messages that typically appear if modifications to email rules are made [4]. In this case, it is likely the malicious actor was attempting to implement this property to obfuscate the creation of new email rules.

The ‘StopProcessingRules’ rule meant that any subsequent email rules created by the legitimate user would be overridden by the email rule created by the malicious actor [5]. Finally, the implementation of “MoveToFolder” would allow the malicious actor to automatically move all outgoing emails from the “Sent” folder to the “Deleted Items” folder, for example, further obfuscating their malicious activities [6]. The utilization of these email rule properties is frequently observed during account hijackings as it allows attackers to delete and/or forward key emails, delete evidence of exploitation and launch phishing campaigns [7].

In this incident, the new email rule would likely have enabled the malicious actor to evade the detection of traditional security measures and achieve greater persistence using the Microsoft 365 account.

Figure 3: Screenshot of the “New Email Rule” model breach. The Office365 properties associated with the newly modified Microsoft Outlook inbox rule, “.”, are highlighted in red.

Account Update

A few hours after the creation of the new email rule, Darktrace observed the threat actor successfully changing the Microsoft 365 user’s account password, this time from a new IP address in Texas. As a result of this action, the attacker would have locked out the legitimate user, effectively gaining full access over the SaaS account.

Figure 4: The model breach event log showing the user password and token change updates performed by the compromised SaaS account.

Phishing Emails

The compromised SaaS account was then observed sending a high volume of suspicious emails to both internal and external email addresses. Darktrace was able to identify that the emails attempting to impersonate the legitimate service DocuSign and contained a malicious link prompting users to click on the text “Review Document”. Upon clicking this link, users would be redirected to a site hosted on Adobe Express, namely hxxps://express.adobe[.]com/page/A9ZKVObdXhN4p/.

Adobe Express is a free service that allows users to create web pages which can be hosted and shared publicly; it is likely that the threat actor here leveraged the service to use in their phishing campaign. When clicked, such links could result in a device unwittingly downloading malware hosted on the site, or direct unsuspecting users to a spoofed login page attempting to harvest user credentials by imitating legitimate companies like Microsoft.

Figure 5: Screenshot of the phishing email, containing a malicious link hidden behind the “Review Document” text. The embedded link directs to a now-defunct page that was hosted on Adobe Express.

The malicious site hosted on Adobe Express was subsequently taken down by Adobe, possibly in response to user reports of maliciousness. Unfortunately though, platforms like this that offer free webhosting services can easily and repeatedly be abused by malicious actors. Simply by creating new pages hosted on different IP addresses, actors are able to continue to carry out such phishing attacks against unsuspecting users.

In addition to the suspicious SaaS and email activity that took place between May 9 and May 10, Darktrace/Email also detected the compromised account sending and receiving suspicious emails starting on May 4, just two days after Darktrace’s initial deployment on the customer’s environment. It is probable that the SaaS account was compromised around this time, or even prior to Darktrace’s deployment on May 2, likely via a phishing and credential harvesting campaign similar to the one detailed above.

Figure 6: Event logs of the compromised SaaS user, here seen breaching several Darktrace/Email model breaches on 4th May.

Darktrace Coverage

As the customer was soon to begin their trial period, Darktrace RESPOND was set in “human confirmation” mode, meaning that any preventative RESPOND actions required manual application by the customer’s security team.

If Darktrace RESPOND had been enabled in autonomous response mode during this incident, it would have taken swift mitigative action by logging the suspicious user out of the SaaS account and disabling the account for a defined period of time, in doing so disrupting the attack at the earliest possible stage and giving the customer the necessary time to perform remediation steps.  As it was, however, these RESPOND actions were suggested to the customer’s security team for them to manually apply.

Figure 7: Example of Darktrace RESPOND notices, in response to the anomalous user activity.

Nevertheless, with Darktrace DETECT/Cloud in place, visibility over the anomalous cloud-based activities was significantly increased, enabling the swift identification of the chain of suspicious activities involved in this compromise.

In this case, the prospective customer reached out to Darktrace directly through the Ask the Expert (ATE) service. Darktrace’s expert analyst team then conducted a timely and comprehensive investigation into the suspicious activity surrounding this SaaS compromise, and shared these findings with the customer’s security team.

Conclusion

Ultimately, this example of SaaS account compromise highlights Darktrace’s unique ability to learn an organization’s digital environment and recognize activity that is deemed to be unexpected, within a matter of days.

Due to the lack of obvious or known indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with the malicious activity in this incident, this account hijack would likely have gone unnoticed by traditional security tools that rely on a rules and signatures-based approach to threat detection. However, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI enables it to detect the subtle deviations in a device’s behavior that could be indicative of an ongoing compromise.

Despite being newly deployed on a prospective customer’s network, Darktrace DETECT was able to identify unusual login attempts from geographically improbable locations, suspicious email rule updates, password changes, as well as the subsequent mounting of a phishing campaign, all before the customer’s trial of Darktrace had even begun.

When enabled in autonomous response mode, Darktrace RESPOND would be able to take swift preventative action against such activity as soon as it is detected, effectively shutting down the compromise and mitigating any subsequent phishing attacks.

With the full deployment of Darktrace’s suite of products, including Darktrace/Cloud and Darktrace/Email, customers can rest assured their critical data and systems are protected, even in the case of hybrid and multi-cloud environments.

Credit: Samuel Wee, Senior Analyst Consultant & Model Developer

Appendices

References

[1] https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2022-10-31-gartner-forecasts-worldwide-public-cloud-end-user-spending-to-reach-nearly-600-billion-in-2023

[2] https://www.upguard.com/blog/saas-security-risks

[3] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/11/16/token-tactics-how-to-prevent-detect-and-respond-to-cloud-token-theft/

[4] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/disable-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps

[5] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/microsoft.exchange.webservices.data.ruleactions.stopprocessingrules?view=exchange-ews-api

[6] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/microsoft.exchange.webservices.data.ruleactions.movetofolder?view=exchange-ews-api

[7] https://blog.knowbe4.com/check-your-email-rules-for-maliciousness

Darktrace Model Detections

Darktrace DETECT/Cloud and RESPOND Models Breached:

SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Multiple Unusual External Sources for SaaS Credential

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Unusual Activity Block (RESPOND Model)

SaaS / Compliance / New Email Rule

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Significant Compliance Activity Block

SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and New Email Rule (Enhanced Monitoring Model)

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious SaaS Activity Block (RESPOND Model)

SaaS / Compromise / SaaS Anomaly Following Anomalous Login (Enhanced Monitoring Model)

SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and Account Update

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious SaaS Activity Block (RESPOND Model)

IoC – Type – Description & Confidence

hxxps://express.adobe[.]com/page/A9ZKVObdXhN4p/ - Domain – Probable Phishing Page (Now Defunct)

37.19.221[.]142 – IP Address – Unusual Login Source

35.174.4[.]92 – IP Address – Unusual Login Source

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic - Techniques

INITIAL ACCESS, PRIVILEGE ESCALATION, DEFENSE EVASION, PERSISTENCE

T1078.004 – Cloud Accounts

DISCOVERY

T1538 – Cloud Service Dashboards

CREDENTIAL ACCESS

T1539 – Steal Web Session Cookie

RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

T1586 – Compromise Accounts

PERSISTENCE

T1137.005 – Outlook Rules

Probability yardstick used to communicate the probability that statements or explanations given are correct.
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Min Kim
Cyber Security Analyst

Blog

Email

Darktrace/Email in Action: Why AI-Driven Email Security is the Best Defense Against Sustained Phishing Campaigns

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26
Sep 2023

Stopping the bad while allowing the good

Since its inception, email has been regarded as one of the most important tools for businesses, revolutionizing communication and allowing global teams to become even more connected. But besides organizations heavily relying on email for their daily operations, threat actors have also recognized that the inbox is one of the easiest ways to establish an initial foothold on the network.

Today, not only are phishing campaigns and social engineering attacks becoming more prevalent, but the level of sophistication of these attacks are also increasing with the help of generative AI tools that allow for the creation of hyper-realistic emails with minimal errors, effectively lowering the barrier to entry for threat actors. These diverse and stealthy types of attacks evade traditional email security tools based on rules and signatures, because they are less likely to contain the low-sophistication markers of a typical phishing attack.  

In a situation where the sky is the limit for attackers and security teams are lean, how can teams equip themselves to tackle these threats? How can they accurately detect increasingly realistic malicious emails and neutralize these threats before it is too late? And importantly, how can email security block these threats while allowing legitimate emails to flow freely?

Instead of relying on past attack data, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI detects the slightest deviation from a user’s pattern of life and responds autonomously to contain potential threats, stopping novel attacks in their tracks before damage is caused. It doesn’t define ‘good’ and ‘bad’ like traditional email tools, rather it understands each user and what is normal for them – and what’s not.

This blog outlines how Darktrace/Email™ used its understanding of ‘normal’ to accurately detect and respond to a sustained phishing campaign targeting a real-life company.

Responding to a sustained phishing attack

Over the course of 24 hours, Darktrace detected multiple emails containing different subjects, all from different senders to different recipients in one organization. These emails were sent from different IP addresses, but all came from the same autonomous system number (ASN).

Figure 1: The sender freemail addresses and subject lines all followed a certain format. The subject lines followed the format of “<First name> <Last name>”, possibly to induce curiosity. The senders were all freemail accounts and contained first names, last names and some numbers, showing the attempts to make these email addresses appear legitimate.

The emails themselves had many suspicious indicators. All senders had no prior association with the recipient, and the emails generated a high general inducement score. This score is generated by structural and non-specific content analysis of the email – a high score indicates that the email is trying to induce the recipient into taking a particular action, which may lead to account compromise.

Additionally, each email contained a visually prominent link to a file storage service, hidden behind a shortened bit.ly link. The similarities across all these emails pointed to a sustained campaign targeting the organization by a single threat actor.

Figure 2: One of the emails is shown above. Like all the other emails, it contained a highly suspicious and shortened link.
Figure 3: In another one of the emails, the link observed had similar characteristics. But this email stands out from the rest. The sender's name seems to be randomly set – the 3 alphabets are close to each other on the keyboard.

With all these suspicious indicators, many models were breached. This drove up the anomaly score, causing Darktrace/Email to hold all suspicious emails from the recipients’ inboxes, safeguarding the recipients from potential account compromise and disallowing the threats from taking hold in the network.

Imagining a phishing attack without Darktrace/Email

So what could have happened if Darktrace had not withheld these emails, and the recipients had clicked on the links? File storage sites have a wide variety of uses that allow attackers to be creative in their attack strategy. If the user had clicked on the shortened link, the possible consequences are numerous. The link could have led to a login page for unsuspecting victims to input their credentials, or it could have hosted malware that would automatically download if the link was clicked. With the compromised credentials, threat actors could even bypass MFA, change email rules, or gain privileged access to a network. The downloaded malware might also be a keylogger, leading to cryptojacking, or could open a back door for threat actors to return to at a later time.

Figure 4: Darktrace/Email highlights suspicious link characteristics and provides an option to preview the pages.
Figure 5: At the point of writing, both links could not be reached. This could be because they were one-time unique links created specifically for the user, and can no longer be accessed once the campaign has ceased.

The limits of traditional email security tools

Secure email gateways (SEGs) and static AI security tools may have found it challenging to detect this phishing campaign as malicious. While Darktrace was able to correlate these emails to determine that a sustained phishing campaign was taking place, the pattern among these emails is far too generic for specific rules as set in traditional security tools. If we take the characteristic of the freemail account sender as an example, setting a rule to block all emails from freemail accounts may lead to more legitimate emails being withheld, since these addresses have a variety of uses.

With these factors in mind, these emails could have easily slipped through traditional security filters and led to a devastating impact on the organization.

Conclusion

As threat actors step up their attacks in sophistication, prioritizing email security is more crucial than ever to preserving a safe digital environment. In response to these challenges, Darktrace/Email offers a set-and-forget solution that continuously learns and adapts to changes in the organization.  

Through an evolving understanding of every environment in which it is deployed, its threat response becomes increasingly precise in neutralizing only the bad, while allowing the good – delivering email security that doesn’t come at the expense of business growth.

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